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Abstract - Although twenty years have elapsed since the beginning of transition, Eastern European 
and Central Asian countries are still characterized by remarkably heterogeneous levels of economic 
development. In the light of the established causal relationship between finance and growth, we 
perform an absolute and conditional convergence analysis with reference to credit markets’ 
development to understand whether the lack of convergence in economic performances may also 
be a side - effect of persistently diversified financial architectures in these transition economies. 
Our investigation highlights: (i) the occurrence of absolute and conditional convergence; (ii) the 
existence of appreciable intra - distribution dynamics in the convergence process; and that, when 
conditioning for cross - country measures of the legal protection of creditors’ rights, (iii) the 
bankruptcy laws and their enforcement strongly boost credit markets’ average period growth rates. 
 
Keywords: convergence, financial market development, investor protection, rule of law. 
 








Simona Benedettini, Department of Economics,University of Siena  
E-mail: sbenedettini@gmail.com 
 I Introduction
After more than ten years of research, the empirical literature on ﬁnance and growth
seems to agree on the fact that ﬁnancial market development is a fundamental determinant
of economic growth and that, in particular, causality runs only in this direction. Indeed,
even though some scholars claim the existence of a bidirectional link (see e.g. Calderon and
Liu (2003)), more recent studies show that causality runs only from ﬁnancial market devel-
opment to growth ( Beck and Levine (2004), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Arestis et al.
(2008)), and that this relationship is not driven by potential biases induced by endogeneity
or unobserved country - speciﬁc characteristics ( Beck and Levine (2004)).
The channels through which stock and credit markets’ performances aﬀect economic
growth are several: (i) an increase in the rate of human and physical capital accumulation (
King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Benhabib and Spiegel (2004)); (ii) an
increment in the rate of the total factor productivity growth ( Benhabib and Spiegel (2004));
(iii) an improvement in the eﬃciency with which capital is used in the economy ( King
and Levine (1993), and Fisman and Love (2007)); (iv) an improvement in the productivity
growth ( Levine and Zervos (1998)); (v) a reduction in the external cost of ﬁnance, and thus
an increase in the innovation process through the establishment of a greater number of ﬁrms
( Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Claessens and Laeven (2003)).
New ﬁndings, however, stress the existence of a non - linear relationship between ﬁnan-
cial and economic development (see, respectively, Fung (2009), and Rioja and Valev (2004)).
The aim as well as the merit of these studies is not to challenge the existence of a link be-
tween ﬁnance and growth, but rather to point out under which conditions the development
of ﬁnancial markets is particularly needed to enhance economic growth. In fact, according
to Fung (2009), the link between ﬁnancial development and economic growth appears to be
stronger in the early phase of economic development, while it tends to weaken as economic
growth becomes persistent. Moreover, it is shown that once critical levels of ﬁnancial market
development are achieved, the catching - up process between poorer and richer countries
is promoted ( Fung (2009), and Aghion et al. (2005)). Indeed, considering a sample of
forty - one economies1 observed during the period 1960 - 1995, Aghion et al. (2005) ﬁnd
the existence of a concave relationship between credit market development (as measured by
the variable Credit provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries to private sector/GDP) and the per
capita GDP. Speciﬁcally, they show that economies above a critical level of credit market
development should converge in growth rates, and that in such countries ﬁnancial develop-
ment has a positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect on steady - state GDP. Similarly, Fung
(2009) argues that “low - income countries with a relatively well - developed ﬁnancial sector
[, as measured by the variables Credit allocated to the private sector/GDP per capita and
Quasi - money/GDP per capita,] [...] are more likely to catch - up to their middle - and high
- income counterparts. [Conversely,] the very poorest countries with a relatively - under -
developed ﬁnancial sector tend to experience a slower growth in both per capita GDP and ﬁ-
nancial development, and are more likely to be trapped in poverty”. Consistently with these
results are the ﬁndings of Rioja and Valev (2004) which show that ﬁnancial development has
a large eﬀect on growth in economies characterized by an amount of Private credit provided
by banking sector/ GDP per capita ranging between fourteen and thirty percent, while in
1The sample they analyze does not include Eastern European and Central Asian countries.
Ithose economies displaying values greater and lower than, respectively, fourteen and thirty
percent, additional improvements in ﬁnancial markets have correspondingly an uncertain
and a positive, but smaller, eﬀect on growth.
In this paper we analyze convergence in credit markets’ development levels (absolute and
conditional, see e.g. Barro and Sala - i - Martin (1992)), and its institutional determinants,
i.e. the legal protection of creditors’ rights and their enforcement, in a sample of twenty
- two transition economies: i.e. Eastern European, South - Eastern European, and Com-
monwealth of Independent States countries. Speciﬁcally, using as proxies of ﬁnancial market
development the ratio Domestic credit to private sector to GDP we: (i) run traditional cross
- section convergence regressions; (ii) carry out a descriptive analysis of countries’ time se-
ries for the relative levels of credit markets’ development; (iii) estimate the corresponding
densities at the beginning and the end of the period. Step (i) aims at identifying not only
whether convergence occurred in transition economies’ ﬁnancial architectures, but also its
potential institutional determinants. Steps (ii) and (iii) allow us to recognize patterns of
intra - distribution dynamics in the convergence process ( Quah (1997)) and, therefore, to
overcome the limits of simple cross - sectional regressions which capture only the behavior
of a conditional average.
The motivations for this exercise, which refers to the period 1994 - 2006, are twofold.
The ﬁrst one straightforwardly emerges from what has been outlined above about the rela-
tionship between ﬁnance and growth. Financial market development is an important source
of economic growth and transition economies still show, despite the passing of twenty years
from the beginning of transition, unsatisfactory2 and, as it appears from Fig. 1, remarkably
heterogeneous growth performances. Understanding whether a catching - up process is un-
derway in the levels of credit market development also enables us to understand whether the
lack of economic convergence may be a potential side - eﬀect of a parallel lack of convergence
in the levels of ﬁnancial advancement. Whatever the answer to this question is, it may open
the way for further investigations and more precise policy implications about the link be-
tween ﬁnance and growth in transition economies. For example, if convergence in the levels
of ﬁnancial market development appears to occur, one could investigate whether it does not
show a parallel with economic convergence, i.e. with convergence of per capita GDP levels,
because the steady state of credit market development toward which transition economies are
converging is lower than a critical threshold at which positive spillovers can be produced on
that convergence (see e.g. Aghion et al. (2005)). Moreover, the analysis of the institutional
determinants potentially aﬀecting the catching - up process may also provide more precise
suggestions about the policies to be implemented in order to aﬀect (other things being equal)
the steady state of ﬁnancial development toward which these economies are converging and
to consequently approach the eventual existing threshold that should be trespassed so that
positive spillovers are produced on economic convergence. Similar remarks apply in the case
where a reduction in the heterogeneity of countries’ ﬁnancial market development levels also
appears not to occur. Indeed, the employment of cross - country measures of the outside
investors’ legal protection, as conditional variables in the convergence regressions, helps to
2For an insight into transition economies’ disappointing growth performances and their potential determinants
see, e.g., Godoy and Stiglitz (2007), and Beck and Laeven (2006). The latter observe that: “Growth in GDP
per capita over the sample period [1992 - 2004] varied between -5.2% in Tajikistan to 5.6% in Albania, with an
average of 0.8% and a standard deviation of 2.7%”, ( Beck and Laeven (2006), p. 173). For a comprehensive
survey of the literature on transition economies’ economic growth see Campos and Coricelli (2002).
IIunderstand whether this protection may be an eﬀective tool to improve countries’ credit
markets’ period average growth rates and thus to foster a catching - up process.
Secondly, the present work aims at ﬁlling the gap in the literature on transition economies
in two directions: (i) by providing a convergence analysis on credit markets’ development lev-
els since, to the best of our knowledge, convergence analyses of transition economies relate to
outcomes diﬀerent from ﬁnancial market development. Among other, we refer to Kutan and
Yigit (2004) - who study, respectively, convergence in growth rates in industrial production,
price levels, M1, and interest rates’ spreads; Beck and Laeven (2006) - who in their anal-
ysis of the institutional determinants of transition economies’ growth performances control
also for convergence in the levels of GDP per capita - and Koˇ cenda (2001) who investigates
convergence in prices and output; (ii) by studying, from a long - run perspective, the role
of the outside investors’ legal protection, both de jure and de facto, on ﬁnancial market ad-
vancement. The pioneering work on the role of minority shareholders’ and creditors’ rights
in enhancing ﬁnancial market development is due to La Porta et al. (1998), who however do
not include transition economies. Pistor et al. (2000), on whose endeavors the present work
builds, ﬁll the gap by analyzing the same relationship for Eastern European and Central
Asian countries. However, the latter investigate the institutional determinants of ﬁnancial
market development in transition economies at a given point in time. In contrast, we look
at the potential eﬀects the outside investors’ rights can produce on the dynamics of credit
markets’ long term growth performances.
Our main ﬁndings are the followings: (i) a tendency toward convergence clearly occurs
in credit markets’ development levels; (ii) there is evidence of remarkable intra - distribution
dynamics in the convergence processes; (iii) the legal provisions concerning the creditors’
control rights in the bankruptcy process, and their enforcement, are a strong predictor of
the average period growth rates of credit market development.
Section II provides a description of the data used in the econometric analysis. Section
III presents the results of the regression analysis. Section IV further investigates the evi-
dence illustrated in Section II through a descriptive overview of transition economies’ credit
markets’ development dynamics, including the density estimations. Section V concludes.
II Description of the data
We are interested in investigating the appearance of a catching - up process in credit mar-
ket development levels for a sample of twenty - two transition economies: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Rus-
sia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. To this end, we examine the occurrence of absolute and
conditional convergence ( Barro and Sala - i - Martin (1992)) with reference to the variable
Domestic credit to private sector/GDP (DC/GDP, henceforth) which is our preferred mea-
sure of ﬁnancial development.
The employment of this speciﬁc measure of ﬁnancial advancement, which is commonly used
in the literature to capture the extent to which ﬁrms’ access to external ﬁnance, is motivated
mainly by the choice of the conditional variables for the conditional convergence analyses:
the indicators given by Pistor et al. (2000) of the quality of the legal protection of credi-
tors’ rights. Indeed, given that our dependent variable is the period average growth rate of
IIIDC/GDP, our work can be considered, in a sense, an extension of that of Pistor et al. (2000).
Actually, while they look at the link between law and ﬁnance for transition economies at a
given point in time, we examine it from a long - run perspective: i.e. by studying whether
and in what way the extensiveness and the eﬀectiveness of several types of creditors’ rights
aﬀect the average period growth rate of our measure of ﬁnancial development. Thus, in
order to more precisely ascribe the results of this extension, we prefer to adhere as much as
possible to the empirical investigation of Pistor et al. (2000), consequently using their same
measure of ﬁnancial development.
Table I provides a detailed description of the variables used in the econometric analysis.
In the following we provide for each of them a brief overview.
As argued previously, the variable DC/GDP is a fairly traditional measure of ﬁnancial
development. Speciﬁcally, since we are also interested in studying the institutional determi-
nants of credit markets’ period average growth rate, this variable provides quite reliable in-
formation on the extent to which ﬁrms rely on external ﬁnance. Precisely, the ratio DC/GDP
represents the amount of ﬁnancial resources provided by banks to the private sector. Data
on ﬁnancial markets’ development are collected from the “World Development Indicators”
dataset published by the World Bank in 2008. For our sample of countries, the dataset allows
us to collect data on these variables only until 2006.
As mentioned previously in this Section, we exploit the dataset of Pistor et al. (2000) for
cross - country measures of the legal protection of the creditors’ rights. In developing their
original and exhaustive indicators assessing the quality of the outside investors’ rights, Pistor
et al. (2000) focus on several scenarios which may potentially shape these rights.
Precisely, by building on the measure of La Porta et al. (1998) assessing creditors’ rights
in the bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, the index LLSVCR assesses the quality
of the bankruptcy and reorganization laws. More precisely, it considers whether secured
creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds resulting from the disposition
of the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm, whether the creditors’ consent is required when ﬁling for
reorganization, etc. The index CREDCON measures the quality of the bankruptcy laws as
well but it has been constructed by considering only some of the aspects involved in LLSVCR.
In fact, according to Pistor et al. (2000) in none of the examined transition economies
is there a clear separation between liquidation and reorganization procedures. Thus, the
index evaluates all the provisions considered in the measure of La Porta et al. (1998) but
excludes ”‘the requirement of the creditors’ consent to ﬁle for reorganization as opposed
to liquidation”’, and takes into account the presence of two more provisions: the existence
of an automatic trigger to go into bankruptcy, and the requirement of creditors’ consent
for adopting a liquidation or reorganization procedure. The variable COLLAT evaluates the
existence of legal rules on security interests. For example, it examines whether the possibility
of establishing a register for security interests exists, whether the possibility of establishing a
security interest in land exists, etc. The index REMEDY measures the capability of creditors
to sanction managers. For example, it analyzes whether creditors can hold managers liable
in case they violate rules of insolvency laws, whether creditors can pierce the corporate veil,
etc. To measure the extent to which creditors’ property rights are enforced, the Rule of law
index (ROL, henceforth) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) is employed.
That property rights institutions, e.g. outside investors’ rights, are a fundamental de-
terminant of ﬁnancial development and that they are relatively more important to this aim
IVTable I
Description of the Variables
Variables Description
DC/GDP Domestic credit provided to private sector/GDP. Domestic credit to private
sector refers to ﬁnancial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of non - equity securities, and trade credits and other
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. Source: World
Bank (2008).
LLSVCR La Porta et al. (1998) ’Creditor rights’ index. The index varies from 0 to
4. It is formed by adding 1 when: (1) restrictions, such as creditors’ consent,
are imposed to ﬁle for reorganization as opposed to liquidation; (2) secured
creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds resulting from the
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm; (3) the debtor does not retain the
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization;
(4) secured creditors are not stayed in the bankruptcy procedure. Source: La
Porta et al. (1998).
CREDCON Pistor et al. (2000) measure of creditors’ rights in the bankruptcy process.
The index varies from 0 to 5. It is formed by adding 1 when: (1) secured
creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds resulting from the
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm; (2) the debtor does not retain the
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization; (3)
secured creditors are not stayed in the bankruptcy procedure; (4) automatic
trigger to ﬁle bankruptcy is established; (5) the adoption of a reorganization
or liquidation plan requires creditors’ consent. Source: Pistor et al. (2000).
COLLAT Pistor et al. (2000) measure of the rules on security interests. The range for
the index is from 0 to 3. It is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the establishing
of a security interest in movable asset does not require the transfer of the
asset; (2) a register for security interests in movable asset is established; (3)
a security interest in land may be established. Source: Pistor et al. (2000).
REMEDY Pistor et al. (2000) measure of the creditors’ ability to sanction management.
The range for the index is from 0 to 3. It is formed by adding 1 when: (1)
management is hold liable in case it violates rules of insolvency laws; (2)
transactions preceding the opening of bankruptcy procedures may be declared
null and void; (3) creditors may pierce the corporate veil. Source: Pistor et
al. (2000).
than e.g. contracting institutions, has been clearly demonstrated by recent researches, (see
e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)) and extensively explored in the literature in past years
(see Beck and Levine (2005) for an exhaustive and critical review on the law and ﬁnance
literature). Since the seminal paper of La Porta et al. (1998), it has been stressed that
the diﬀerences in the quality of the legal protection of outside investors’ rights’, as well as
in its enforcement, explain diﬀerences in the level of countries’ stock and credit market ad-
vancement. Speciﬁcally, well protected creditors’ and minority shareholders’ rights enhance
ﬁnancial market development by reducing the cost of external ﬁnance to ﬁrms. In fact, in
the hypothesis of divergent interests between insiders, i.e. managers and blockholders, and
outsiders of the ﬁrm, i.e. minority shareholders and creditors, the law may exert positive
eﬀects on the company’s ability to raise external funds in two directions: (i) by narrowing
the set of the possible expropriation technologies insiders can use; (ii) by reducing the costs
outsiders bear in trying to reduce moral hazards and adverse selection problems (i.e. using
the terminology of Jensen and Meckling (1976), monitoring, bonding, and respectively, for
shareholders and creditors, residual losses, and reorganization and bankruptcy costs).
As pointed out by La Porta et al. (1998), the diﬀerences appearing in countries’ legal systems,
and thus in their level of ﬁnancial development, vary systematically across legal origins3 and
3Speciﬁcally, they show that common - law countries protect both creditors’ and minority shareholders’ rights
Valso reﬂect, to the same extent, diﬀerences in how far outside investors’ rights are enforced.
Actually, economies belonging to those legal families characterized by less shareholders and
creditors - friendly legislations, and thus less advanced ﬁnancial markets, are also character-
ized by legislation less friendly to shareholders and creditors, and thus with less advanced
ﬁnancial markets, are also characterized by weak enforcement of outsiders’ rights. In other
words, enforcement cannot substitute for law on the books: where the law does not eﬀectively
protect outside investors’ rights, alternative systems of protection, i.e. eﬀective enforcement
mechanisms, have not been developed.
For transition economies, the relationship between ﬁnancial development and outside
investors’ legal protection seems to be controversial. The main works on the topic are the
pioneering paper of Pistor et al. (2000), and that of Slavova (1999). Actually, Pistor et
al. (2000) ﬁnd that, for transition economies, what really matters in enhancing ﬁnancial
markets’ development is not the relative extent of the outside investors’ rights, as it emerges
from countries’ law on the books, but rather their enforcement. Conversely, Slavova (1999)
conﬁrms only in part the results of Pistor et al. (2000) arguing that countries’ credit market
performance is not aﬀected by the relative extent of banking sector regulation, but only by
its enforcement, while the quality of regulation of the stock markets appears to inﬂuence
their development.
By building on Pistor et al. (2000), i.e. by using the indicators they develop and their
same proxy of credit market development, in this paper we extend the analysis of the eﬀects
of extensiveness of the outside investors’ legal protection on the ﬁnancial markets’ develop-
ment, in the following ways: (i) by investigating this relationship in a convergence analysis
framework which, as far as we know, it has never been explored; and consequently, (ii) by
performing a long - run analysis. Indeed, by using the indicators of Pistor et al. (2000) as
conditional variables in the convergence regressions, we are allowed to see whether the law
on the books is a determinant of the average period growth rates of our measure of credit
market development.
These features distinguish our analysis from that of Pistor et al. (2000) and Slavova (1999)
not only because of the diﬀerent type of relationship we are interested in, i.e. they look at
the level of credit market development in a given point in time, while we look at the average
period growth rate, but also because of the extent of the period covered by our analysis.
In contrast with these analyses, which are conducted with reference to a speciﬁc year, our
investigations involves a cross - section analysis relative to a period of twelve years. In this
way, we are able to: (i) dilute any eﬀects the privatization processes may have exerted on the
dependent variable, i.e. the period average growth rate of our measure of ﬁnancial develop-
ment, which may happen when the latter is examined at a given point in time and especially
at the outset of the transition; (ii) focus on long - run dynamics which are probably of more
interest to us.
In the following Section we present the results of the convergenceregressions. Our ﬁndings
mainly highlight a tendency toward convergence in the levels of credit market development
and that the quality of the bankruptcy laws plays an important role in fostering this tendency.
the most , while the French and the German - civil - law countries protect them the least, with the former
performing slightly worse than the latter, especially with reference to creditors’ rights.
VIIII Convergence in ﬁnancial markets’ development lev-
els: the role of creditors’ legal protection
This Section presents the results of the regressions performed to investigate the occur-
rence of a reduction in the heterogeneity of transition economies’ credit markets’ development
levels. In addition, we focus on the role played by the legal protection of creditors’ rights on
convergence.
Regression results
Table II provides the results of the convergence analysis with reference to credit markets
for a sample of twenty - two countries examined during the period 1994 - 2006. Given that
the indicators of Pistor et al. (2000), which we use as conditional variables, are developed
solely for the years 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998, and that, for some of our economies, data
on our measure of credit development are not available in the early 1990s, our observation
period starts in the year in which two conditions are contextually met: (i) the possibility to
use at least one year of the time series of Pistor et al. (2000)’ s indicators; (ii) to have, given
condition (i), the largest possible number of observations, for the dependent variable, so as
to achieve the maximum feasible number of degrees of freedom, given the number of controls
employed in the regressions. The ﬁrst year between 1992 - 1998 for which these conditions
are contextually satisﬁed is, indeed, 1994 when evidence on DC/GDP and quality of the
law on the books is available for a balanced panel of nineteen countries: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
In addition, we include countries like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan for which data are available
only from 1995, and Romania for which data are available since 1996. In the Appendix we
provide the results for the balanced panel of nineteen countries, i.e. those for which data are
available for the whole period 1994 - 2006, and we show that the results are not aﬀected at
all by the changes in the sample composition.
We estimate the following models:
DC/GDPGR = α + β1Log(DC/GDPIN) + ui (1)
to test the occurrence of absolute convergence (column (I) of Table II), and:
DC/GDPGR = γ + β2Log(DC/GDPIN) + β3LOB + β4ROL + ǫi (2)
to test the occurrence of conditional convergence (columns (II) - (V) of Table II).
Where: (i) DC/GDPGR is the period average growth rate of our proxy of credit market
development: (ii) DC/GDPIN is the value of DC/GDP at the beginning of the period; (iii)
LOB, which stands for law on the books, accounts for the alternative cross - country measures
developed by Pistor et al. (2000) to assess creditors’ rights; and (iv) ROL which stands for
rule of law, is our proxy for property rights’ enforcement.
VIITable II provides evidence of the occurrence of both absolute and conditional convergence
in the levels of credit market development. A better qualiﬁcation of the results suggests
that: (i) looking at the absolute convergence speciﬁcation, the magnitude of convergence
is slightly smaller than that appearing in the speciﬁcations relative to the conditional con-
vergence analysis; (ii) the quality of the law on the books in protecting creditors’ rights
during the bankruptcy procedure, as measured by the LLSVCR and CREDCON indicators,
enhances the period average growth rate. In this regard it is important to observe that
diﬀerent measures of the quality of the bankruptcy regulation lead to diﬀerent results. In
fact, looking at the measure of La Porta et al. (1998), LLSVCR, creditors’ rights appear to
strongly aﬀect the dependent variable. By contrast, looking at the indicator of Pistor et al.
(2000), CREDCON, which better adapts the measure of La Porta et al. (1998) to transition
economies, the eﬀect seems to be much weaker4; (iii) the eﬀectiveness of the enforcement
mechanisms, as proxied by the ROL index, exerts a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the period average growth rate as well, and precisely when the law on the books turns
out to be not statistically signiﬁcant.
In Fig. 2 we provide a straightforward picture of the occurrence of convergence in credit
market development levels. In the Appendix we present the same pictures for the balanced
sample of nineteen transition economies.
The econometric analysis performed provides a very clear picture about the relative per-
formances of Eastern European and Central Asian countries’ ﬁnancial markets and also
oﬀers important suggestions about the growth and ﬁnance relationship for these countries.
Precisely, it makes possible to answer the question we ask at the beginning of this article:
whether, in the light of the link between ﬁnance and growth, the apparent non - convergence
in the levels of economic development could be considered a side - eﬀect of an eventual non -
convergence in ﬁnancial development levels. In this regard, our investigations suggest that,
during the period considered, a tendency toward the reduction in the heterogeneity of these
countries’ ﬁnancial performances has occurred, and that therefore there is no parallel be-
tween ﬁnancial and economic development dynamics. Obviously, this does not mean that a
link between these two phenomena does not exist at all. Rather, our ﬁndings might open the
way to future investigations. For example, one could argue, and then investigate, whether a
reduction in the heterogeneity of ﬁnancial markets’ development levels is not accompanied
by a similar scenario for the levels of economic development because the steady state of
ﬁnancial advancement toward which these countries are converging is lower than a critical
threshold needed so that positive eﬀects on the economic convergence are produced ( Aghion
et al. (2005)). As argued at the beginning of this work, it could be worthy to use the frame-
work developed by Aghion et al. (2005) - which investigates the role of ﬁnancial market
development in promoting countries’ convergence to the growth rate of the world technology
frontier - to study whether the lack of convergence in terms of GDP per capita that transition
economies are experiencing is due to the fact that the steady state of ﬁnancial development
toward which they are converging is such that less developed transition economies are not
allowed to converge to most advanced transition countries’ level of economic development.
Our ﬁndings provide suggestions also in this direction. Indeed, by controlling in our spec-
iﬁcations for some of the possible determinants of the steady state, i.e. outside investors’
rights and their enforcement, it emerges that the creditors’ rights during the bankruptcy
4See Table I for details on the composition of the two indexes.
VIIIprocedures and their enforcement aﬀect the steady state in a statistically signiﬁcant way.
In the next Section we provide a descriptive analysis of the time series of countries’
relative values of the level of credit market development, and of the density estimations of
these relative values at the beginning and end of the period. These analyses contribute to
testing the robustness and scrutinizing more deeply the convergence process highlighted in
the present section.
Table II
Absolute and conditional convergence in credit market development levels
Cross - section regressions on a sample of 22 transition economies. The dependent variable is the average growth
rate of the variable DC/GDP. The independent variables are: (1) Log(DC/GDPIN); and the period average
values of: (2) LLSVCR; (3) CREDCON; (4) COLLAT; (5) REMEDY ; (6) ROL.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of signiﬁcance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.



















































Observations 22 22 22 22 22
Adjusted R
2 0.50 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.62
F − statistic 21.70 22.06 15.22 12.55 12.66
IV Patterns of development
This Section aims to test the robustness of our regressions’ results: i.e. the occurrence of
a tendency toward the reduction of the heterogeneity in the levels of credit market develop-
ment. In particular, given that cross - country regressions capture solely the behavior of a
conditional average, ( Quah (1997)), we want to be sure that our ﬁndings are not driven by
the behavior of a particular group of economies. To this aim, we: (i) look at the countries’
time series of the relative levels of our measure of credit market development; (ii) perform
a density estimation of this measure at the beginning and at the end of the period. The
former analysis supplies preliminary evidence of the occurrence of convergence and, overall,
tests for the presence of intra - distribution dynamics in the evolution over time of transition
economies’ ﬁnancial development. Step (ii) gives further conﬁrmation of the reduction in the
dispersion of credit market development levels.
The fact that transition economies, despite the fast progress they experienced at the
outset of transition, still possess underdeveloped credit markets, with reference both to
IXmore advanced and to emerging economies, is unquestioned in the literature. After twenty
years from the beginning of the transition, there has been a plethora of papers assessing
the ﬁnancial (non - )advancement of these economies and its relative determinants. To this
purpose an exhaustive analysis is provided by Bonin and Wachtel (2002).
Today, the situation appears to be almost the same. In fact, it is possible to note that the economies
we consider are still characterized by underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets if compared to both more
advanced
5 and emerging countries, (see Fig. 3).
Despite the common feature of poor ﬁnancial performances, transition economies’ convergence
process appears to be characterized by remarkable diﬀerences. Indeed, our analysis of the dynamics
of countries’ relative values of credit market development highlights, in addition to the occurrence
of a tendency toward convergence, : (i) the presence of appreciable intra - distribution dynamics;
and, using the words of Bergl¨ of and Bolton (2002); (ii) that despite a tendency toward convergence,
some countries appear as to have still to cross the divide, as their remarkably lower levels of ﬁnancial
development show.
In the following, we illustrate these results in more details.
Credit markets’ patterns of development
Fig. 5 provides the density estimation of the relative values of the variable DC/GDP at the
beginning and the end of the considered period for a sample of twenty - two transition economies
6.
Conﬁrming the results of the regressions performed, these economies appear to convergence in their
levels of credit market development. In fact, Fig. 5 shows the occurrence, at the end of the period,
of a reduction in the dispersion of the relative levels of DC/GDP.
Evidence of a notable reduction in the heterogeneity of the levels of credit market development
also emerges from the analysis of the countries’ time series of the relative values of DC/GDP (see
Fig. 4)
7. And indeed, if at the beginning of the period there were countries showing levels of credit
market development more than three times the sample average (i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Bulgaria, with the Czech Republic being an outlier), at the end of the period the diﬀerences in
the level of credit market development are much smaller and they do not overcome the threshold of
twice the sample average.
Fig. 4 also provides evidence of intra - distribution dynamics in the convergence process. Actu-
ally, we observe that: (i) relative positions at the bottom end appear essentially stable, so that the
reduction in dispersion seems to be ascribable to the reduction in the margin by which countries
starting at above - average values in 1994 exceed the average; (ii) Poland, Slovenia, and Croatia
show an inverted U - shaped dynamic; (iii) Latvia, and similarly Ukraine, perform outstandingly,
showing an initial level of DC/GDP less than the sample average and ending with a value around
twice the sample average.
In addition, it is possible to note that: (i) countries like Latvia, Estonia, Croatia and Slove-
nia reach slightly higher levels of credit market development (their respective value of the variable
DC/GDP in 2006 are: 86.79%, 78.39%, 68.78%, and 68.73%), being thus responsible for the ten-
dency to bimodality appearing in Fig. 5; (ii) countries like Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Albania,
and Azerbaijan show substantially lower levels of credit market development than the rest of the
sample (their ﬁnal levels of DC/GDP are respectively: 10.52%, 8.83%, 19.51%, 21.83%, and 12.38%)
5In 2006 OECD countries showed average values for the variable DC/GDP of 164%. The average values for
our sample of transition economies was 22% .
6The initial level of the variable DC/GDP is considered to be that of 1994 for all countries except Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan whose data are available only from 1995. In the Appendix we provide the same graph with respect
to the balanced sample of nineteen transition economies.
7In the Appendix we provide the same analysis with respect to the balanced sample of nineteen transition
economies.
Xwith Kyrgyzstan and Armenia showing persistence in their corresponding dynamics (indeed, their
initial levels of DC/GDP was, respectively, equal to 12.54%, and 11.08%); (iii) in 2000 there is a
clear separation between economies that, despite starting from similar levels of ﬁnancial develop-
ment, go on to reach remarkably diﬀerent positions. Actually, we ﬁnd that economies like Lithuania,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia, Bulgaria, and Croatia set themselves apart from countries like Ar-
menia, Belarus, Georgia, Romania, and Azerbaijan by reaching, later, higher levels of credit market
development; (iv) countries that apparently had still to cross the divide ten years after the beginning
of the transition process, i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine ( Bergl¨ of and Bolton (2002),
p. 82), today appear to have successfully done it. Indeed, as Fig. 4 shows, these countries’ credit
markets experienced high growth rates which allowed them to close the gap with the more advanced
countries of the sample. However, for these countries succeeding in crossing the divide, there are
others which have still to do this (see point (ii)).
The descriptive investigations presented in this Section appear to conﬁrm the evidence of the
convergence regressions: i.e. the occurrence of a tendency toward a reduction of the heterogeneity
in the levels of ﬁnancial market development. However, they also point out that the convergence
dynamic seems to occur with substantial diﬀerences between countries, as well as that there exists a
gap with more advanced and other emerging economies to be ﬁlled. Actually, despite the improve-
menat in the performances of many countries, some others like e.g. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, seem
to have still to cross the divide.
V Conclusions
Although twenty years after the beginning of the transition process have been elapsed, East-
ern European and Central Asian economies are still experiencing unsatisfactory and heterogeneous
economic performances. In the light of the link between ﬁnance and growth, in this paper we ask
whether the heterogeneity in economic development may be a consequence of equally diversiﬁed
levels of ﬁnancial market development.
If in the literature it is unquestioned that transition economies’ credit markets are, after all,
displaying patterns of underdevelopment (thus probably explaining part of their poor economic
achievements), a diﬀerent scenario occurs with reference to the heterogeneity in countries’ ﬁnancial
performances.
Actually, our analysis highlights that transition economies are experiencing a tendency toward
convergence with reference to credit market development levels, even though remarkable intra -
distribution dynamics appear to occur in this convergence process.
Moreover, we have shown that the extent to which creditors’ rights are protected and enforced
in the bankruptcy procedure signiﬁcantly fosters the catching - up process with reference to credit
markets.
Our ﬁndings open the way for future directions of research, especially with reference to the
link between growth and ﬁnance for transition economies. Indeed, given the negative answer to
the question opening the present paper, i.e. whether a non - reduction in the heterogeneity of
economic performances may be considered a side - eﬀect of the non - reduction in the heterogeneity
of ﬁnancial development, it would be worth knowing whether the level of ﬁnancial advancement
toward which transition economies are converging is not yet suﬃciently high to produce positive
eﬀects on economic convergence.
In addition, a further research direction that might be pursued is to extend our analysis by
considering convergence in the level of ﬁnancial advancement with more developed countries like, in
particular, Western Europe economies.
The policy implications of this work are straightforward. To improve the quality of creditors’
rights as well as their enforcement appears to be worthwhile in promoting credit market growth
XIrates and, accordingly to the theoretical framework behind our convergence analysis, to aﬀect the
credit market steady - state toward which convergence is occurring.
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Density estimation of ’GDP per capita’
Figure 1: Density estimation of the relative values of the real per capita GDP in 1991 an 2006 for a sample of
twenty - two transition economies. This ﬁgure clearly shows an increase in the dispersion of the values of the real
































































1 2 3 4 5
Log initial level of ’DC/GDP’
Beta conv. in the levels of credit mkt development
Figure 2: Beta convergence in credit markets’ development levels for a sample of twenty - two countries.












































Values in 2006 of DC/GDP for transition economies and a comparison group of emerging countries
Figure 3: Credit market development in 2006: comparison with a sample of emerging markets.





































































Time series of the level of ’Domestic credit to private sector/GDP’
Figure 4: Countries’ time series of the relative
values of ’DC/GDP’ for a sample of twenty - two
economies.















































Density estimation of ’Domestic credit to private sector/GDP’
Figure 5: Density estimation of the relative val-
ues of ’DC/GDP’ at the beginning and end of the
period for a sample of twenty - two economies.
XIVVII Appendix
Table III
Absolute and conditional convergence in credit market development levels for the
balanced panel of 19 countries
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of the variable DC/GDP during the period 1994 - 2006. The
independent variables are: (1) Log DC/GDPDin 1994; and the period average values of: (2) LLSVCR;
(3) CREDCON; (4) COLLAT; (5) REMEDY; (6) ROL.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of signiﬁcance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.


















































Observations 19 19 19 19 19
Adjusted R
2 0.55 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.64





























































1 2 3 4 5
Log initial level of ’DC/GDP’
Beta conv. in the levels of credit mkt development
Figure 6: Beta convergence in credit market development levels for a sample of nineteen countries.















































































Time series of ’Domestic credit to private sector/GDP’’
Figure 7: Countries’ time series of the relative
values of ’DC/GDP’ for a sample of nineteen tran-
sition economies.















































Density estimation of ’Relative level of ’Domestic credit to private sector/GDP’
Figure 8: Density estimation of the relative values
of ’DC/GDP’ in 1994 and 2006 for a sample of
nineteen transition economies.
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